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Abstract
Social and communication impairments are part of the essential diagnostic criteria used to define Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASDs). Difficulties in appreciating non-literal speech, such as irony in ASDs have been explained as due to
impairments in social understanding and in recognizing the speaker’s communicative intention. It has been shown that
social-interactional factors, such as a listener’s beliefs about the speaker’s attitudinal propensities (e.g., a tendency to use
sarcasm, to be mocking, less sincere and more prone to criticism), as conveyed by an occupational stereotype, do influence
a listener’s interpretation of potentially ironic remarks. We investigate the effect of occupational stereotype on irony
detection in adults with High Functioning Autism or Asperger Syndrome (HFA/AS) and a comparison group of typically
developed adults. We used a series of verbally presented stories containing ironic or literal utterances produced by a
speaker having either a ‘‘sarcastic’’ or a ‘‘non-sarcastic’’ occupation. Although individuals with HFA/AS were able to
recognize ironic intent and occupational stereotypes when the latter are made salient, stereotype information enhanced
irony detection and modulated its social meaning (i.e., mockery and politeness) only in comparison participants. We
concluded that when stereotype knowledge is not made salient, it does not automatically affect pragmatic communicative
processes in individuals with HFA/AS.
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Introduction
Social and communication impairments are part of the essential
diagnostic criteria used to define Autism Spectrum Disorders
(ASDs) [1,2]. These impairments are often related to a serious
deficit in the capacity for mentalizing [3], the natural tendency to
explain everyday actions in terms of mental states. High
Functioning Autism (HFA) and Asperger Syndrome (AS) are
widely acknowledged to be variants on this spectrum [1,2]. While
HFA commonly refers to individuals with a history of speech and
language delay, individuals with AS show no evidence of delayed
language function. Moreover, differently from individuals with
low-functioning autism, adults with HFA and AS (HFA/AS) do
pass first- and second-order Theory-of-Mind or mindreading (i.e.,
the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others; ToM)
tests [4–5], but they may fail in more ‘advanced’ ToM tasks, based
on the detection of sarcasm, irony or bluff [6] or the recognition of
Faux Pas [7,8].
Using a computer-mediated communication program, Rajen-
dran, Mitchell and Rickards [9] examined non-literal language
comprehension in children and adolescents with HFA/AS and
found that they were able to make appropriate responses in a
verbal irony comprehension task. More recently, using a
computer-mediated communication procedure, Glenwright and
Agbayewa [10] confirmed that when verbal and social demands
are minimized, children with HFA/AS are able to perform as well
as control participants on measures of verbal irony comprehen-
sion, such as judging the speaker’s intentions and irony’s social
function of conveying humour.
However, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen [11] reported that although
adults with HFA are able to grasp the speaker’s ironic intent (i.e.,
that the speaker meant something other than the literal meaning),
they may encounter difficulties processing mental state informa-
tion and are less able than control subjects to use contextual
information to justify the speaker’s utterance. Along the same
lines, in a neuroimaging study, Wang and collaborators [12] found
good accuracy at irony detection along with a different pattern of
neural activity in children with HFA, as compared to the typically
developed group, when trying to incorporate contextual informa-
tion in order to make inferences about speaker ironic intent.
Specifically, the authors interpreted the significantly greater
activity observed in the right inferior frontal gyrus and in the
temporal regions bilaterally as reflecting different strategies for
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irony comprehension and greater cognitive demands in children
with HFA.
It has been shown that irony comprehension requires the
acquisition of the shared knowledge and communicative strategies
adopted by a social community [13]. Irony is regarded as a more
polite, and indirect, way of expressing a speaker’s criticisms [14–
16]. In the case of an ironic insult, the most widespread form of
sarcasm, the speaker’s attitude is regarded as being more positive
than it is for its literal counterpart [17]. Such positiveness, known
as the ‘‘Tinge Effect’’ [17,18] would be induced by the obligatory
processing of the literal (positive) interpretation of ironic
statements in negative situations, which would attenuate the
negativity expressed by these statements, when ironically inter-
preted.
Various sources of information might influence the modulation
of the overall meaning of the ironic comment. Irony understand-
ing depends in part on the strength of the social cues contextually
available for inferring the speaker’s intent. According to Colston
[19], the degree of negativity expressed by an ironic comment
would depend on how critical the situational context perceived by
the listener is, relative to the positiveness of the comment,
ironically intended by the speaker. Hence, as proposed by Fussell
and Kreuz [20], both psycholinguistic processes (e.g., lexical
retrieval, syntactic processing) and social-interactional factors
affect irony interpretation. Stereotypes are energy-saving devices
associated with an automatic, unintentional, and unconscious
process [21]; they guide expectations, inferences, and impressions,
and shape interpretations and memory retrieval [22].
Remarkably, Pexman and Olineck [23] showed that speaker
characteristics conveyed by an occupation stereotype are integrat-
ed in the linguistic comprehension process and may cue ironic
intent when other contextual cues are minimal. For example, the
effect of occupation stereotype information on irony comprehen-
sion has been explained by what people imagined about target
individuals [24]. Specifically, an occupation stereotype affects
irony comprehension if that occupation is strongly consistent with
speaker behaviour. Similarly, it has been shown that people recall
information better and more readily when it is consistent with a
preexisting stereotype than when it is inconsistent [25]. Speakers’
propensities to be humorous, mocking, less sincere and more
prone to criticism act as salient cues for ironic intent. Thus, such
speaker characteristics facilitate irony detection by indicating that
the speaker is likely to have a negative attitude and that such an
attitude would be indirectly expressed through humour and
insincerity. Conversely, if the speaker’s occupational stereotype is
consistent with sincerity and seriousness, the listener might be less
likely to detect the speaker’s ironic intent [26–28]. All these
features contribute to setting up a specific ‘‘ironic context’’ and
enhance the speaker’s ironic attitude [29].
A speaker’s social stereotype (e.g., occupation, gender and
ethnic group) also influences memory for and interpretation of
potentially ironic remarks at a very early stage in the process of
sarcasm and irony comprehension [23,30]. Using online reading
tasks, Pexman, Ferretti and Katz [28] reported that when speaker
occupation was mentioned, reading times were longer at the
statement’s end indicating that speaker occupation knowledge is
integrated with lexical and syntactic information relatively early,
even in the absence of an explicit decision about speaker intent. By
using a series of puppet show scenarios, Pexman and collaborators
[13] reported that children with HFA exhibited spared compe-
tence for irony comprehension, though group differences in
processing strategies, in terms of gaze behavior and response
latencies, likely reflected a less elaborate understanding of others’
communicative intents. Notably, they failed to detect the intended
humor conveyed by ironic criticisms and failed to appreciate the
broader social function of irony, such as the speaker’s intent to be
simultaneously critical and humorous.
Recently, Hirschfeld and collaborators [31] have showed that
ToM abilities are not crucial for acquiring social stereotypes, but
they might be used to overcome them. Individuals with ASDs who
have diminished mindreading capacities might find it easier to
understand others as group members using stable character traits
rather than explaining human behaviour by processing the large
variety of detailed information available during on-line social
interaction. Indeed, according to White and collaborators [32], the
propensity to make judgments based on race and gender
stereotypes in adults with AS is similar to that for typically
developed populations, suggesting that the use and acquisition of
stereotype knowledge can proceed along with diminished social
engagement and ToM abilities. However, while this study provides
evidence about the ability to use stereotypic knowledge in explicit
tasks, it does not tell us to what extent this knowledge is
spontaneously used in everyday communication.
Rumsey and Hamburger [33] proposed that a core deficit of
autism consists in a broad class of verbal and nonverbal conceptual
reasoning disabilities. In the same line, Minshew and Goldstein
[34] put forward a multiple primary cognitive deficit model that
described the cognitive profile of individuals with autism spectrum
disorder as a disorder of complex information processing across
cognitive domains. Complexity is defined in terms of the number
of elements contained in the stimulus material as well as the
multiplicity of cognitive processes involved in task performance.
Within a cognitive theory, complex information processing
requires the integration of multiple features and the reliance on
different component processes. Across domains, complex infor-
mation processing theory provided an explanation for the
particular constellation of deficits that define ASDs, including
impairments in concept formation, complex memory, complex
language, and skilled motor abilities. The consequences of
impaired complex information processing in ASDs would be also
manifested in real-world situations, as this population will
experience difficulty in fast dynamic social interactions because
of their inability to quickly process relevant information on line.
In the present study, we aimed to investigate whether, as has
previously been shown for typically developed subjects [23], social
stereotype information can be used to enhance irony detection in
individuals with HFA and AS. Given their difficulties in using
context information and integrating them during communication
and on-line comprehension processing one might expect that
stereotype information would not enhance the propensity in
individuals with ASDs to interpret an utterance as ironic in those
circumstances in which the stereotype would favour an ironic
interpretation (i.e. a sarcastic occupation). To investigate whether
individuals with HFA or AS can use and integrate occupational
stereotype knowledge in an irony comprehension task, we used a
series of verbally presented stories containing either a sarcastic-
ironic or literal statement uttered by a speaker characterised as
having a ‘‘sarcastic’’ (i.e., perceived as more prone to use sarcasm)
or ‘‘non-sarcastic’’ occupation. As already reported [26], people
perceive speakers with certain occupations as being more likely to
use irony than speakers with other occupations.
Given that the ability to process and integrate different types of
information on-line rapidly and efficiently might be impaired in
this population, one could also expect a reduced effect of
stereotype knowledge on pragmatic processes underlying irony
comprehension. Verbal irony can serve many social functions:
Speakers can temper the aggression conveyed by criticism, or
praise conveyed by a compliment (the Tinge Hypothesis) [35],
Irony and Stereotype Knowledge in Autism
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while bringing humour to a situation. A full understanding of
ironic language requires one to make complex inferences about
speaker intent, a task that can be challenging for individuals with
ASDs who might have difficulties with mentalizing in social
contexts or with the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli.
According to Pexman and Olineck [18], the degree of perceived
irony would be a way to assess listeners’ ToM abilities while the
degree of perceived politeness would be a way to assess their social
competence more broadly. In the present study, we also assessed
whether occupational stereotype would influence recognition and
apprehension of the communicative (i.e., mocking) and social
features of irony (i.e., politeness). It is possible that they would fail
to fully appreciate the social function of irony, such as its mocking
and positive dimensions, indicating difficulties with pragmatic
processing. Such subtle differences in pragmatic understanding
may underlie some of the social difficulties faced by individuals
with ASDs.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventeen adults with a clinical diagnosis of High Functioning
Autism (HFA) (N = 6) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) (N = 11)
according to DSM-IV R (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) and ASDI (Asperger Syndrome Diagnostic Interview)
[36], were recruited from Albert Chenevier Hospital in Cre´teil
(Table 1). The inclusion and exclusion criteria for the clinical
group were based on retrospective parental information about the
early language development of their child. All diagnoses were
made by experienced clinicians and were based on clinical
observations of the participants. Interviews with parents or
caregivers using the ADOS (The autism diagnostic observation
schedule-generic) [37] and the ADI-R (Autism Diagnostic
Interview) [38] confirmed the diagnoses. The cut-off points for
the three classes of behaviour for the ADI are a score of 10 for
reciprocal social interaction [B], 8 for communication [C], and
3 for stereotyped behaviours [D], respectively. All participants
scored above the cut-off points.
Seventeen typically developed comparison participants (CP)
volunteered to match the clinical group with respect to age, IQ
and gender (Table 1). Prior to their recruitment, the comparison
participants were screened to exclude any with a history of
psychiatric or neurological disorders. All participants were native
French speakers, and had normal/corrected to normal vision. All
participants received basic neuropsychological screening, which
included Verbal and Performance IQs (WAIS-III) [39]. All
participants had an IQ above 70. Overall, individuals with
HFA/AS did not differ from the comparison participants on
gender, chronological age (t-test: t(32) = 1.14, p = 0.26), education
(t-test: t(32) = 0.17, p = 0.87), Full-scale (t(32) = 0.43, p= 0.7),
verbal (t(32) =20.12, p= 0.90) and Performance (t(32) = 1.1,
p= 0.31) (Table 1).
The present research has been approved by the local Ethical
committee (Inserm, Institut The´matique Sante´ Publique; C07-33).
All participants signed informed consent agreements before
volunteering for this study, and all investigation complied with
APA ethical standards.
Procedure
Before running the main experiment, a pilot study was
conducted on a preliminary set of 45 occupations. Forty French
native speakers were required to rate the probability that a
person with a given occupation would make an ironic utterance
using a 1 (low probability) to 7 (high probability) rating scale. All
of these participants were chosen from the general population
(mean age: 29, SD 4.2) and did not participate in the
experiment. The following seven occupations were judged to
have the highest probability of ironic remarks (sarcastic
occupations): comedian, talk show host, actress, artist, mechanic, plumber
and insurance agent. The following seven occupations were judged
to have the lowest probability of ironic remarks (‘‘non-sarcastic
occupations’’): accountant, clergyman, scientist, librarian, waiter, bank
teller and veterinarian.
Participants in the experiment were individually tested in a quiet
room at the Albert Chenevier Hospital in Cre´teil. In line with
Pexman and Olineck’ study [23], twenty-one pairs of stories,
containing either an ironic or a literal utterance were visually
presented on a computer screen with no time limit. Each
statement (ironic or literal) was uttered by a speaker having either
a sarcastic occupation or a non-sarcastic occupation within seven
stories (see Table 2 for examples). A no occupation condition, in
which the speakers were only identified by surname, was included
to rule out the possibility that participants would adopt a response
strategy of predicting job information for each story. Testing time
varied from approximately 45 to 60 minutes. The test consisted of
two separate sessions with a short interval in between (15 to
20 min). Additional breaks or refreshments were given when
requested. Stories having the same context and the same speaker
uttering an ironic or a literal statement were presented in different
sessions. Within each session, stories were presented in random-
ized order to avoid order effect, and session presentation was
counterbalanced across subjects. Stories were visually presented on
a computer screen and were available throughout the experiment.
Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of demographic and clinical data for participants with HFA/AS and the comparison
participants.
HFA/AS Comparison
N (male:female ratio) 14:3 12:5
Age in years (mean, SD, range) 27.3 (7.3); 18–40 30.1 (9.7); 20–47
Education in years (mean, SD) 13.4 (3.8); 8–18 13.5 (2); 10–18
ADI [B,C,D]* 18.6 (6.8); 11.6 (6.6); 6.9 (3.2) 2
Full-scale IQ 93.7 (21.1); 70–137 96.2 (10.9); 80–116
Verbal IQ 99.3 (20.1); 70–143 98.7 (9.9); 85–123
Performance IQ 90.7 (18.4); 70–122 95.9 (10.3); 80–118
* [B] = reciprocal social interaction, [C] = communication, [D] = stereotyped behaviours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095568.t001
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Participants were asked to read each story attentively before
answering questions. There was no time limit.
The experimenter introduced the experiment as follows: ‘Here,
on this computer screen, you will be presented with a series of
stories describing social situations with one person, the speaker,
expressing a judgment about another person. You are to read each
story presented on this computer screen for as long as you wish.
When you are finished reading the whole story, you will be asked
to answer some questions. If you think that everything is clear and
feel ready to start, you should press the space bar on the computer
keyboard’’. Participants were invited to ask clarification questions;
if needed, the experimenter could also read the stories. The
experimenter sat close to the subject. The computer screen was
placed in front of the participant and each story remained
available throughout the reading and questioning. A training
session of five trials preceded the experiment, and allowed
participants to familiarise themselves with the task and with the
response measures. Specifically, participants were required to use
the rating scales and ask for clarifications. The following definition
of irony was given: Verbal irony is a statement in which what the speaker
means is different from what he/she ostensibly states. The experimenter
also provided a few examples of verbal irony (e.g. ‘‘The speaker
says ‘‘It’s a lovely day,’’ in a downpour of rain). Consistency
between responses to the first question (‘‘Speaker Intent Ques-
tion’’) and irony rating was also used to ensure that participants
fully understood how to use the scales and the notion of ‘‘irony’’.
The first question, the ‘‘Speaker Intent Question’’ (‘‘What does the
speaker actually mean?’’) allowed us to assessed accuracy at irony
detection, that is the ability to understand whether the last remark
in the story had been intended as ironic or literal, by a forced
choice question (‘‘Does he mean that Marie-E`ve has a good memory?’’ or
‘‘Does he mean that Marie-E`ve does not have a good memory?’’).
Then, using four 7-point rating scales, participants had to judge
whether the speaker was ironic (ranging from 1 = not at all ironic to
7 = extremely ironic), mocking (1 = not at all mocking and 7 =
extremely mocking), and polite (1 = not at all polite and 7 =
extremely polite). The last question, a control question, was
specific to each story and allowed us to verify that participants had
not gotten confused or forgotten important details of the story.
The story was placed in front of the participant and remained
there throughout the reading and questioning so that participants
did not have to remember it. This was done in order to minimize
memory and attention requirements.
Data Collection and Analyses
Conformity to the assumptions of parametric statistics was
assessed using the Komolgorov-Smirnov Normality test (x2(2,
N = 39) = 1.42, p = 0.98), to check that the data came from
normally distributed samples and the F-test was used for equality
of variances (F(21,16) = 0.49, p = 0.14).
The data were analysed using repeated-measures ANOVAs
with factors Groups (2: CPs, HFA/AS) X Statement (2: ironic,
literal) X Speaker’s occupation (2: non-sarcastic, sarcastic).
Scheffe’s tests were used for post-hoc analysis. Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients were calculated across all partic-
ipants between clinical measures and test results. Measures of
effect size were calculated for each effect of interest by providing
the Partial Eta-squared for ANOVAs and Cohen’s d for t-test.
The level of significance was at ,0.05.
Results
Speaker Intent
A forced choice question assessed whether participants correctly
recognized that speakers made literal or ironic compliments within
a given context. Overall, 80% of CP and 72.5% of HFA/AS
correctly recognized the speaker’s communicative intent, that is
whether the utterance was to be interpreted as ironic or literal.
Repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a marginally significant
main effect of Group (F(1,32) = 2.9; p = 0.09, gp
2 = 0.09) and
significant main effects of Statement (F(1,32) = 34.4; p,0.0001,
gp
2 = 0.51) and Occupation (F(1,32) = 22.6; p,0.0001,
gp
2 = 0.41). The effect of Statement was due to both groups
performing significantly better in the literal condition than in the
ironic one (mean difference =21.7; p,0.0001), while the Occu-
pation effect was due to the greater number of correct responses
on the speakers’ sarcastic occupation condition, as compared to
the speaker’s non-sarcastic occupation condition (mean differ-
ence =20.75; p,0.0001). These effects were qualified by a
significant Statement X Occupation interaction (F(1,32) = 10.9;
p = 0.002, gp
2 = 0.25), and a significant Statement X Occupation
X Group interaction (F(3,96) = 6.6; p = 0.01, gp
2 = 0.17). The
significant Statement X Occupation interaction was due to the
greater number of correct responses for the sarcastic occupation as
compared to the non-sarcastic occupation in the ironic statement
condition (mean difference =21.14; p= 0.006), while this differ-
ence was not significant in the literal condition (mean differ-
ence =20.35; p= 0.17). The Statement X Occupation X Group
interaction further revealed that this difference was significant only
for the CPs (p= 0.001) and not for the group with HFA/AS
Table 2. Examples of story types.
Stories Context
Literal
statement
Ironic
statement
1. Stories with speakers
having a sarcastic
occupation
Marie-Eve told his friend, an actor (sarcastic occupation), that she could
memorize a poem of 20 lines in 5 minutes. Marie-Eve recited only half a
poem and forgot the rest.
The day after, the actor says to Guillaume:
Marie-E`ve has a
mediocre memory.
Marie-E`ve has a
phenomenal memory.
2. Stories with speakers
having a non-sarcastic
occupation
A veterinarian (non-sarcastic job) sees Joannie arriving at work on
Monday morning. Joannie seems to be a little bit more tired than usual.
At midday, the actor says to Pierre:
Joannie does not
look well.
Joannie looks well.
3. Control stories with
speakers with no
occupation
Louise (no job) has moved house today and Michel has told her that
he will come to help her all day. Michel comes to help Louise
but just for a few minutes.
The following day, Louise says to Ame´lie:
Michel is
uncooperative.
Michel is helpful.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095568.t002
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(p= 0.37) (Figure 1). The Occupation X Group (F(1,32) = 2.5;
p= 0.12, gp
2 = 0.07) and the Statement X Group (F(1,32) = 0.02;
p= 0.88, gp
2 = 0.0007) interactions were not significant.
Irony Rating
Irony ratings were analyzed only for those trials on which
participants correctly responded to the speaker’s intended
meaning. For ratings of the extent to which a speaker was being
ironic, there were highly significant main effects of Statement
(F(1,32) = 87.7; p,0.0001, gp
2 = 0.72) and Occupation
(F(1,32) = 13.5; p= 0.0009, gp
2 = 0.30), as well as a significant
Statement X Occupation interaction (F(1,32) = 8.2; p= 0.007,
gp
2 = 0.20), a group X occupation interaction (F(2,64) = 4.2;
p= 0.047, gp
2 = 0.11) and a significant Statement X Occupation
X Group interaction (F(3,96) = 5.0; p= 0.032, gp
2 = 0.13). The
main effect of Group (F(1,32) = 0.3; p= 0.56, gp
2 = ) and the
Statement X Group interaction (F(1,32) = 1.6; p= 0.21, gp
2 = 0.04)
were not significant.
For both groups, irony ratings were higher when the statements
were ironic as compared to literal (mean difference = 2.1; p,
0.0001), while the Occupation effect was due to the higher irony
ratings when the speakers had a sarcastic occupation as compared
to speakers with non-sarcastic occupations (mean difference =2
0.42; p= 0.0009). As revealed by the significant Statement X
Occupation interaction, this difference was only significant in the
ironic statement condition (p= 0.01) and not in the literal one
(p= 0. 89). Moreover, the Statement X Occupation X Group
interaction effect revealed that, in the irony statement condition,
the irony ratings were higher for speakers with sarcastic
occupations than for speakers with non-sarcastic occupations only
for the CPs (p= 0.001), while the difference was not significant for
the HFA/ASs (p= 0.54). Mean rating of ironic utterances
pronounced by sarcastic speakers was higher for CPs than for
participants with HFA/AS (p= 0.05) (Figure 2).
Mockery Rating
Mockery ratings were analyzed only for those trials on which
participants correctly responded to the speaker’s intended
meaning. Repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of
Statement (F(1,32) = 36.2; p,0.0001, gp
2 = 0.55) and Occupation
(F(1,32) = 14.5; p= 0.0006, gp
2 = 0.34), as well as significant
interaction effects of Statement X Occupation (F(1,1) = 8.7;
p= 0.006, gp
2 = 0.17) and Occupation X Group (F(2,64) = 5;
p= 0.03, gp
2 = 0.12). The group difference was not significant
(F(1,32) = 1.5; p= 0.22, gp
2 = 0.07), nor were the Statement X
Group (F(1,32) = 2.6; p= 0.12, gp
2 = 0.07), and Statement X
Occupation X Group (F(3,96) = 1.3; p= 0.27, gp
2 = 0.03) interac-
tions significant.
Ironic statements were rated as more mocking than the literal
statements (mean difference = 1.3; p,0.0001) and the statements
uttered by the speakers with a sarcastic occupation were rated as
more mocking than the statements uttered by speakers with a non-
sarcastic occupation (mean difference =20.41; p= 0.0006), How-
ever, as revealed by the Statement X Occupation and the
Occupation X Group interactions, the difference between the
mocking ratings produced by the two types of speakers was
significant only for the ironic statement condition (p= 0.004), and
for the comparison group (p= 0.02), but not for the HFA/AS
group (p= 0.28). Mean rating of mockery for utterances pro-
nounced by sarcastic speakers was significantly higher for CPs
than for participants with HFA/AS (p= 0.01) (Figure 3).
Politeness Rating
Politeness ratings were analyzed only for those trials on which
participants correctly responded to the speaker’s intended
meaning. Repeated-measures ANOVA yielded significant main
effects of Statement (F(1,32) = 70.9; p,0.0001, gp
2 = 0.56) and
Occupation (F(1,32) = 25.7; p,0.0001, gp
2 = 0.34), as well as a
significant Occupation X Group interaction (F(2,64) = 18.1;
p= 0.0002, gp
2 = 0.34) and a Statement X Occupation X Group
interaction (F(3,96) = 4.5; p= 0.04, gp
2 = 0.17). No significant
main effect of Group (F(1,32) = 0.4; p= 0.50, gp
2 = 0.02) was
found. Neither Statement X Occupation (F(1,32) = 0.6; p= 0.4,
g2 = 0.02) nor Statement X Group (F(2,64) = 0.001; p= 0.97,
gp
2 = 0.0007) interactions were significant.
Figure 1. Number of correct responses produced by the two
participant groups as a function of the statement (Ironic and
Literal) and of the speaker (Sarcastic and Non-sarcastic). Error
bars are standard deviations. * p,.0005; ** p,.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095568.g001
Figure 2. Irony ratings (1= not at all ironic and 7= extremely
ironic) of the speaker statement by the two participant groups
as a function of the statement (Ironic and Literal) and of the
occupation (Sarcastic and Non-sarcastic). Error bars are standard
deviations. * = p,.05; ** = p,.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095568.g002
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The effect of Statement was due to the ironic statements being
rated as more polite than the literal statements (mean differ-
ence = 1.9; p,0.0001), while the Occupation effect was due to the
statements uttered by the speakers with non-sarcastic occupation
being rated as more polite than the ones uttered by the speakers
with sarcastic occupation (mean difference = 0.3; p,0.0001). Post-
hoc Scheffe’s tests revealed that this difference was significant only
for the CPs (p= 0.02), while participants with HFA/AS rated
ironic statements pronounced by the two types of speaker as
equally polite (p= 0.86). Mean rating of politeness for ironic
utterances pronounced by non-sarcastic speakers was significantly
higher for CPs than for participants with HFA/AS (p= 0.05) while
there was no significant group difference in the other conditions
(Figure 4).
Control Questions
No group difference was found on the number of correct
responses for the control questions on the two pairs of twenty-one
stories (t(1,30) = 0.7, p = 0.47; Cohen’s d=20.30). Both partici-
pants with HFA/AS (mean = 41.560.8; range = 40–42) and
comparison participants (mean = 41.760.5; range = 41–42) re-
sponded equally to the control questions. Overall, participants
correctly understood the stories. The few errors committed
concerned irrelevant details that did not crucially affect task
performance (e.g., ‘‘Samuel arrived two hours late at the meeting’’ instead
of ‘‘Samuel arrived one hour late at the meeting’’ or ‘‘The first course was too
salty’’ instead of ‘‘The main course was too salty’’).
Occupation Stereotype Judgment
To assess whether, like the comparison group, participants with
HFA/AS possess acquired occupation stereotype knowledge or
whether they are unable to use it in the context of irony
understanding, in a subsequent session we asked participants with
HFA/AS to rate the probability that persons with the occupations
used in the experimental task would make a sarcastic utterance, a
criticism, a mocking, or a polite remark by using a 1 (low
probability) to 7 (high probability) rating scale. The sarcastic
occupations (i.e., comedian, talk show host, actress, artist, mechanic,
plumber and insurance agent) were judged as having a higher
probability of sarcasm (mean rating = 4.2, 60.2; t(16) = 7.7; p,
0.0001; Cohen’s d= 3.1), criticism (mean rating = 4.4, 60.8;
t(13) = 5.7; p,0.0001; Cohen’s d= 1.8), mocking (mean rat-
ing = 4.4, 60.9; t(13) = 8.4; p,0.0001; Cohen’s d= 1.5) and less
polite (mean rating = 5.360.8; t(13) =24.6; p = 0.0004; Cohen’s
d=21.2) remarks than the non-sarcastic occupations (i.e.,
accountant, clergyman, scientist, librarian, waiter, bank teller and veterinar-
ian) (Mean rating for sarcastic = 2.4, 60.8; criticisms = 2.87, 60.9;
mocking = 2.6, 61.4 and less polite = 6.160.5) remarks. The
evaluation of each occupational category for irony propensity did
not differ from that provided by a group of 17 age and gender
matched subjects participating to the pilot study for both the
sarcastic (mean rating = 4.460.6; t(32) = 0.8; p = 0.41 Cohen’s
d= 0.4) and non-sarcastic ones (mean rating = 2.560.4; t(32) = 0.4;
p = 0.7; Cohen’s d= 0.1).
Discussion
The present study aimed to investigate irony comprehension
and understanding of social occupational roles in individuals with
HFA/AS, and whether these two sources of knowledge would be
processed in an integrated manner in communicative tasks. The
results showed that participants with HFA/AS exhibited no
difficulties understanding irony (i.e., utterances having a meaning
that is the opposite of the literal meaning), confirming relatively
preserved abilities to perform pragmatic reasoning tasks
[10,40,41]. In fact, HFA/AS and comparison groups recognized
a comparable number of ironic utterances and, accordingly, for
both groups, the level of irony assigned to the ironic utterances was
higher compared to the literal ones. Overall, participants
performed significantly better in the literal condition than in the
ironic one, confirming the claim that irony is more difficult to
understand than literal language and makes greater cognitive
demands [42,43].
Verbal irony plays an important role not only in conveying
attitudes, but also as a reminder of moral, social and aesthetic
Figure 3. Mockery ratings (1= not at all mocking and 7=
extremely mocking) of the speaker statement by the two
participant groups as a function of the statement (Ironic and
Literal) and of the occupation (Sarcastic and Non-sarcastic).
Error bars are standard deviations. * = p,.05; ** = p,.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095568.g003
Figure 4. Politeness ratings (1= not at all polite and 7=
extremely polite) of the speaker statement by the two
participant groups as a function of the statement (Ironic and
Literal) and of the occupation (Sarcastic and Non-sarcastic).
Error bars are standard deviations. * = p,.05; ** = p,.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095568.g004
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norms tacitly shared by a culturally-defined social group [14, 35].
Importantly, a full understanding of irony requires some
appreciation of why the speaker has chosen this communicative
strategy to express her thought. Irony is generally perceived as a
less negative, more humorous and polite manner of expressing
criticism than its literal paraphrases [23,26,27,29,35]. According
to the echoic account [44,45], the point of irony is not to commit
the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed by the
statement, but rather to express a certain type of derisory or
dissociative attitude to a tacitly attributed thought. In other words,
the speaker in irony mode is echoing a thought she attributes to
someone else, while she conveys her mocking, sceptical or
contemptuous attitude to that thought. Processing such a tacit
dissociative attitude requires metarepresentational and social
abilities that, according to the present findings, appear to be
preserved in our group of adults with HFA or AS.
In a recent study, Pexman and collaborators [13] showed
unimpaired irony comprehension, but difficulties with the
appreciation of the intended humor conveyed by ironic criticisms
in children with HFA. These results are not in accordance with the
present findings showing that adults with HFA were able to
appreciate the social features of irony. However, the two
experimental groups have different chronological ages and this
might help explain the improvement in adults’ performance.
Indeed, it is likely that greater practice with social situations would
play an important role in increasing the understanding of social
norms in individuals with HFA/AS.
The present results reveal that occupation stereotype informa-
tion modulates and improves irony detection only in comparison
participants. As previously shown [18,28], the speaker’s sarcastic
occupation (e.g., actor, talk show host), which is associated with
psychological traits and propensities consistent with irony,
enhances detection of ironic intent, whereas a non-sarcastic
occupation (e.g., clergyman, scientist) - being inconsistent with an
ironic interpretation of that utterance - did not favor such an
interpretation in comparison participants. Consistently, speaker’s
sarcastic occupation increased ratings of the speaker’s ironic and
mocking attitude with typically-developed adults. In contrast, for
individuals with HFA/AS, speaker’s occupation stereotype did not
enhance accuracy performance in irony comprehension and did
not modulate irony and mockery ratings as a function of the
speakers’ occupation. Given these expectations elicited by
occupation stereotypes, typically-developed adults also regarded
an ironic criticism expressed by a speaker with a sarcastic
occupation as being less polite than the same insults expressed
by speakers with a non-sarcastic occupation, showing that
knowledge about the stereotypical traits associated with the
speakers’ occupation influenced other pragmatic and communi-
cative processes related to the social function of irony. Such an
effect seems to be absent in participants with HFA/AS who,
despite their overall spared ability to understand irony and its
social functions (i.e., irony is considered as being more mocking
and polite than literal utterances), attributed equal level of
mockery and politeness to both types of speakers. However, when
explicitly asked to rate the probability that a person having one of
the occupations used in the experimental task would make a
sarcastic, a humoristic and a polite remark, participants with
HFA/AS exhibited a propensity to perceive some occupations as
being more ironic, sarcastic, mocking and polite than others,
similarly to typically developed individuals. The present results
point to a preserved ability to acquire and retrieve social
occupational stereotypes in an explicit way, although such
knowledge is not integrated in pragmatic reasoning in participants
with HFA/AS to the same extent as in the comparison group.
Social stereotypes are cognitive structures (sets of associated
beliefs) stored in long term semantic memory, containing large
networks of abstract information about traits, attributes and
expected behaviors of members of social groups. Stereotype
information can be automatically activated in the presence of
stimulus cues in the environment, such as a member of the
stereotyped group or some symbolic equivalent. It does not require
conscious effort when it exerts an influence on the encoding and
interpretation of behaviour. This automatic stereotype processing
involves unintentional or spontaneous activation of a well-learned
set of associations or responses that have been acquired through
repeated experience, while the controlled stereotype-related
processes may exert a modulatory or inhibitory effect on
automatically activated stereotypes [22]. Social stereotype knowl-
edge might be part of a dedicated cognitive neural system,
functionally dissociable from comparable classes of information in
the brain, which stores and processes abstract person-based
knowledge [46]. This dedicated knowledge memory system serve
a fundamental aspect of social-cognitive functioning that might
have evolved to deal with socially relevant information [47], since
it allows making general prediction about people behaviours, when
prior experience or on-line interaction are reduced.
Using a task of attribution of trustworthiness, attractiveness,
socioeconomic status and age, White and collaborators [32]
reported a preserved ability to make social stereotype judgments
from photographs in participants with AS, despite their impair-
ments in facial perception and mentalizing. Similarly, Hirschfeld
and collaborators [31] showed intact reasoning about social groups
in children with autism, since they performed like typically
developing children in using race and gender stereotypes to predict
behaviors in new contexts. Importantly, these studies focused on
explicit measures to assess sensitivity to stereotypes in ASDs, such
as asking the participants directly to make person judgments based
on group membership.
Indeed, recent studies have shown that stereotype does not
affect behaviour and attitudes only when one is required to make
an explicit judgment about the speaker. There is substantial
evidence that such information is automatically activated in the
presence of a member or symbolic equivalent of the target group
[22] and that the use of in social communicative tasks mostly relies
on automatic and involuntary processes. As previously revealed
[18], when participants were not asked to make an explicit
decision about speaker intent, reading time measures showed that
speaker occupation information is integrated at an early stage of
statement processing. The same was likely the case in the present
experiment in which the speaker’s occupation is never overtly
elicited during task completion.
Thus, the present findings show spared abilities to form and
retrieve social stereotype knowledge, along with a reduced
automatic effect of stereotype information upon pragmatic-
inferential reasoning in participants with HFA/AS. It is possible
that failure to integrate information from distinct special-purpose
mechanisms, such as the ‘‘Naı¨ve Sociology’’ system, implicated in
processing knowledge about social groups, and the ‘‘Naı¨ve
Psychology’’ system responsible for mind-reading [39] might lead
to longer response times in computing on-line pragmatic-
inferential processes during social interaction, in people with
ASDs. This explanation is consistent with the Minshew and
Goldstein [34]’s cognitive model which regards ASDs as a
complex information processing disorder affecting higher-order
inferential cognitive ability.
It is noteworthy that depending on circumstances, as stereotype
attitudes are simplified conceptions of persons and groups, they
can also be maladaptive and originate prejudices. In accordance
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with our findings, a recent study using the Implicit Association
Test [48], a computerized classification paradigm, showed that
participants with ASDs are less affected by the influence of
stereotypes than typically developed controls [49]. Therefore,
since individuals with ASDs are less prone to use automatic
stereotypes, one might expect a reduced conformity to social
norms and reduced stereotype attitudes in these individuals,
relative to typically developed individuals.
Conclusions
The present study confirms that stereotype knowledge is
spontaneously activated during the psycholinguistic processing
involved in irony comprehension and that information about
ironic intent is combined with pragmatic and social information in
typically developed subjects. In particular, stereotype knowledge
exerts its influence on subjects’ expectancies by enhancing irony
detection and its social traits in an implicit manner. In contrast,
although adults with HFA/AS possess a preserved ability to
understand irony and exhibit a developed capacity for under-
standing social stereotypes, when this knowledge is not made
salient, it is not integrated and used in pragmatic communicative
processes. Therefore, while we conclude that irony comprehension
is preserved in adults with HFA/AS, occupational stereotypes do
not appear to engage those automatic processes that, in some
circumstances, might enhance detection of the speaker’s commu-
nicative intents and attitudinal features. Such reduced automatic-
ity exerted by stereotype information might explain some of the
impairments in rapid communication and on-line social interac-
tion in individuals with HFA or AS. Hence, it is possible that the
use of this information in social and communicative reasoning
would occur only when it is previously activated through explicit
and controlled processes.
Further studies are needed to investigate how different types of
stereotypes are encoded and activated, as well as how this
information covertly and overtly interacts with social reasoning
and perception in individuals with ASDs.
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